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discussion on ‘de weaponization’ and/or the prevention of 
an arms race in outer space (and more often than not pre-
sented as mutually exclusive alternatives).
While laudable as an effort to help preserve the realm of 
outer space, so far not having experienced any use of armed 
force in the classical meaning of the word, for peaceful pur-
poses, the draft PPWT from a legal perspective has one ma-
jor flaw which will inevitably cause it to remain a dead let-
ter. This does not refer to the (more politically-oriented) 
debate on whether ‘weapons in space’ are really the most 
threatening issue to be addressed or whether ‘space debris’ 
and other modes of interference with space activities are ac-
tually more important. Nor does it refer, as such, to the (es-
sentially political) debate on whether a legally binding trea-
ty or a ‘soft-law’ instrument, legally non binding but per-
haps politically-binding, would be preferable.4
The legal flaw of the draft PPWT by contrast resides in 
the inability to properly define the core notion of ‘weap-
on,’ in particular in the context of outer space where most, 
if not all hardware, software and activities are of a dual-use 
character. ‘Dual-use’ is taken to mean here that they can 
be used both for military, including aggressive, and non-
military, including commercial purposes, without much 
further conversion or redesign. If one is going to realize a 
‘hard-law’ treaty obligation for most or all important space 
powers not to put any weapons in outer space, however, a 
clear-cut and indisputable definition of that concept would 
be indispensable.
--------------------
4 Cf. on these issues I. Marboe (editor), Soft Law in Outer Space—The Func-
tion of Non-Binding Norms in International Space Law (2012).
On my way to boarding the plane headed for Geneva for 
purposes of participating in the UNIDIR Conference on 
Space Security, April 2-3, 2013,1 I was once more reminded 
by several notices that I was not allowed to take, inter alia, 
any knife with me into the aircraft. Mind you: not just knives 
specially produced or converted to wound or kill people, but 
any knife, including knives specially produced or convert-
ed for example to cut bread—because, obviously, also those 
could wound or kill people on an aircraft, and there would 
be little upfront guarantee about absence of malicious intent 
on my part to use any knife for such purposes.
This is essentially also why, upon closer view, the Russo-
Chinese proposal for a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the 
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use 
of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT),2 which was 
first put on the table on 2008 in the Conference on Disarma-
ment, will not work—whereas the EU-initiated, and by now 
inter alia US-supported, Code of Conduct for Outer Space 
Activities,3 proposed in its first version in the same year of 
2008, from that same vantage point may be successful. Both 
were also revisited at the aforementioned UNIDIR Confer-
ence as major elements of the long-standing, but still current
--------------------
1 See http://swfound.org/news/all-news/swf-successfully-co-organizes-
the 2013-unidir-space-conference/ for further details on the conference.
2 Draft PPWT, or Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weap-
ons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects; 
presented February 12, 2008 to the Conference on Disarmament; e.g. http://
www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/paros/parosindex.html (click on the trea-
ty’s comprehensive name).
3 See for the text revised as of 2010, Annex, Conclusions adopted by the 
Council on September 27, 2010; Council of the European Union, Doc. 14455/10 
of October 11, 2010; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/
st14455.en10.pdf.
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program before becoming a physical reality, which turned 
the debate into a moot one.) And with the 9/11 attacks, a 
similar question arose in adjacent legal realms as to wheth-
er aircraft could not also, under circumstances, constitute 
‘weapons of mass destruction.’7 
Following a first wave of criticism on the handling of this 
definitional problem, the draft PPWT undertook an effort to 
refine the concept of ‘weapon’ by referring to ‘special pro-
duction or conversion’ to serve as a weapon, as the crucial 
distinguishing line between hardware to be prohibited and 
hardware not to be pro hibited in outer space.8 However, if 
already in the case of a simple knife it is not considered fea-
sible to distinguish, from a security perspective, between 
knives specially produced or converted for wounding and 
killing respectively for cutting bread, how could one make 
that distinction work in the context of outer space and hard-
ware launched into it, being so far away from inspection and 
monitoring opportunities as well as being of such a compli-
cated high-technology nature?
Not accidentally therefore also in terrestrial realms, apart 
from the limited set of treaties referred to above prohibiting 
narrowly defined and relatively easily-distinguishable types 
of weapons, efforts to establish, maintain and/or enhance in-
ternational and national security by legal means have been 
largely channeled not through prohibiting the hardware in-
volved, but through prohibiting their use other than in a set of nar-
rowly defined circumstances.
Thus, in terms of threat or use of force against the integrity 
of another state—always at the heart of the international and 
national security debates—only two main exceptions have 
been recognized to the baseline prohibition thereof by Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter.9 One concerns the notion of self-de-
fense, individually or collectively, provided by Article 51 of 
the UN Charter.10 The other concerns the customary practice
--------------------
8 Art. I(c), PPWT, defines ‘weapons in outer space’ as “any device placed in 
outer space, based on any physical principle, specially produced or converted 
to eliminate, damage or disrupt normal function of objects in outer space, on 
the Earth or in its air, as well as to eliminate population, components of bio-
sphere critical to human existence or inflict damage to them;” emphasis add-
ed.
9 Art. 2(4), Charter of the United Nations (hereafter UN Charter), San Fran-
cisco, done 26 June 1945, entered into force October 24, 1945; USTS 993; 24 UST 
2225; 59 Stat. 1031; 145 UKTS 805; UKTS 1946 No. 67; Cmd. 6666 & 6711; CTS 
1945 No. 7; ATS 1945 No. 1; provides: “All Members shall refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integri-
ty or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
10 Art. 51, UN Charter, states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack oc-
curs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Mea-
sures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be im-
mediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter 
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or re-
store international peace and security.”
Here, experience has shown that it is very hard already in 
terrestrial realms to define such a broad concept as ‘weap-
on’ with any acceptable level of precision, thus essentially 
precluding any global agreement on prohibiting them. Only 
where focused on special types of weapons have internation-
al treaties on banning them, including their testing and stock-
piling, achieved a measure of success. This applies to such 
narrowly defined and easily-delineated categories as nucle-
ar weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons, cluster 
munitions and landmines.5
However, as soon as slightly broader categories came to be 
used in such a context, relevant efforts were doomed to run 
into trouble. The most prominent example in the context of 
outer space concerns the reference to ‘weapons of mass de-
struction’ as it is amongst others found in Article IV of the 
1967 Outer Space Treaty.6 While presumably clear in com-
bining nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as soon as 
in the 1980s US plans were developed to build a space de-
fense infrastructure (the Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI) 
based on the use of laser weapons, the dispute on whether 
such weapons were also included in the concept of ‘weapons 
of mass destruction’ reared its head e and was never satisfac-
torily solved. (It was the simple unilateral cancellation of the
--------------------
5 Cf., e.g., Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, New York, done September 24, 
1996, not yet entered into force; Cm. 3665; 35 ILM 1439 (1996); Treaty for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Mexico City, done Febru-
ary 14, 1967, entered into force September 20, 1967; 634 UNTS 281; 6 ILM 521 
(1967); South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Rarotonga, done August 6, 
1985, entered into force December 11, 1986; 1445 UNTS 177; ATS 1986 No. 32; 
24 ILM 1440 (1985); Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nucle-
ar Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the 
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof, London/Moscow/Washington, done 
February 11, 1971, entered into force May 18, 1972; 955 UNTS 115; TIAS No. 
7337; 23 UST 701; UKTS 1973 No. 13; Cmnd. 4678; ATS 1973 No. 4; 10 ILM 
145 (1971); S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-28 (1997); Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and 
on Their Destruction (hereafter Chemical Weapons Convention), New York, 
done September 3, 1992, entered into force April 29, 1997; 1974 UNTS 45; S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weap-
ons and on their Destruction, London/Moscow/Washington, done April 10, 
1972, entered into force March 26, 1975; 26 UST 583; 11 UKTS, Cmd. 6397; 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (hereafter Chemi-
cal Weapons Convention), New York, done September 3, 1992, entered into 
force April 29, 1997; 1974 UNTS 45; S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21; and Conven-
tion on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weap-
ons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscrim-
inate Effects, Geneva, done October 10, 1980, entered into force 2 December 
1983; 1342 UNTS 7.
6 Art. IV, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explo-
ration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
(Outer Space Treaty), London/Moscow/Washington, done January 27, 1967, 
entered into force October 10, 1967; 610 UNTS 205; TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410; 
UKTS 1968 No. 10; Cmnd. 3198; ATS 1967 No. 24; 6 ILM 386 (1967); provides 
in relevant part: “States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit 
around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of 
weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or sta-
tion such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”
7 See for example the indictments against Zacarias Moussaoui as a co-con-
spirator in the 9/11 attacks by a federal grand jury in United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia inter alia on a federal charge of “con-
spiracy to use weapons of mass destruction” with reference to “weapons of 
mass destruction, namely, airplanes intended for use as missiles;” UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA -v- ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI,
a/k/a “Shaqil,”
a/k/a “Abu Khalid al Sahrawi,” Defendant; Count Four, at 2; http://www.
justice.gov/ag/moussaouiindictment.htm.
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mentioned generic prohibition on the threat or use of force 
and the four possible exceptions thereto to not apply in out-
er space as well.
It is for this reason finally that the Code of Conduct—by 
contrast to the draft PPWT—has a fair chance of success as 
it essentially builds upon the successes of, and experience 
with general international law in the realm of international 
and national security. Satellites, from the above perspective, 
are mankind’s knives in outer space: capable of both causing 
horrible death and destruction and providing essential ser-
vices for humanity.
Prohibiting all weapons—as is the case on aircraft—in out-
er space would essentially cause space activities to come to 
a screeching halt, and for that reason alone would be politi-
cally utopian. But distinguishing between hardware special-
ly produced or converted for causing damage and hardware 
not so produced or converted, as the draft PPWT now does, 
is an artificial distinction which not only is extremely diffi-
cult to monitor in practice, but already in theory makes lit-
tle sense: a knife ‘produced’ for cutting bread does not even 
need to be ‘converted’ to be instantly used for the purpose of 
wounding or killing someone.
In building upon the approach to address behavior rather 
than hardware in outer space, the Code of Conduct by con-
trast provides more specific limitations and more precise pa-
rameters to any allowable threats to space activities in them-
selves as well as threats to earth from outer space, which in-
cludes the threats or use of force in outer space. Whilst its (at 
least initial) non-binding nature may be deplored by many as 
contrasted with the benefit of having a treaty of binding na-
ture such as aimed for by the draft PPWT, the lack of likeli-
hood of that draft being successful should not allow the best 
to become the enemy of the good.
which has grown out of the UN Charter context, notably Ar-
ticle 42, to mandate—within specific limits asserted by UN 
Resolutions—the use of force against states officially deter-
mined to present major threats to international peace and se-
curity by the UN Security Council.11 
Without going into a detailed discussion of the proper le-
gal parameters, perhaps even validity, thereof, it may be fur-
ther posited that there are—at best—two further areas where 
the threat or use of force may be legally acceptable. One con-
cerns a right of self-defense beyond the somewhat limited ver-
sion thereof contained in the UN Charter, as a right under 
customary international law.12 Here, however, immediately 
further limitations as to proportionality and necessity should 
serve to minimize the possible abuse of such a justification 
for undue purposes. Those same parameters should also be 
deemed to apply to other presumably allowable measures 
of force, as ‘reprisals’ where not the integrity of a state could 
be argued to be at stake but ‘merely’ important security and 
other national interests, such as in the case of destruction of a 
satellite providing important services.
Again without going into a discussion into the specific pa-
rameters (Is preventive self-defense allowable? The use of 
force for humanitarian purposes even if not mandated by the 
United Nations? To what extent does economic and politi-
cal pressure amount to a ‘threat or use of force’?) it should 
be pointed out here that general public international law and 
more specifically the UN Charter are also considered appli-
cable to outer space and space activities by virtue of Article 
III of the Outer Space Treaty.13
As Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, the only article in 
the classic UN space treaties directly dealing with the mil-
itary use of outer space, provides for a few rather general 
parameters only, there is no reason to consider the above-
--------------------
11 Art. 42, UN Charter, provides that “the Security Council (…) may take 
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or re-
store international peace and security. Such action may include demonstra-
tions, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of 
the United Nations.” On the basis of this clause, in particular the internation-
al, US-led military operations against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (first for invad-
ing Kuwait, much later on the unjustified claims Iraq’s development of weap-
ons of mass destruction had reached a critical phase) and Afghanistan (follow-
ing 9/11) were initiated.
12 Note already that the aforementioned Art. 51, UN Charter, refers to ‘not 
impairing’ ‘the inherent right’ of self-defense.
13 Art. III, Outer Space Treaty, provides that “States Parties to the Treaty 
shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including 
the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, in-
cluding the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining inter-
national peace and security and promoting international cooperation and un-
derstanding.”
